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BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC: securing administrative justice in tax 
tribunals 
Introduction 
BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC (BPP Holdings Ltd)1 marks a useful contribution by the 
Supreme Court (“SC”) on tribunal procedure. The underlying dispute related to VAT, but the 
substantive issues were not relevant here. The key question for the “SC” in this case was 
whether an order issued by the tax chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) debarring 
HMRC from defending an appeal was an order the “FTT” was entitled to make. This central 
question provided the “SC” with the opportunity to generate further guidance on a number of 
related matters and to provide clarity as to whether HMRC can benefit from preferential 
treatment in comparison to other parties in tax proceedings before the “FTT”. The issues the 
case note discusses are the following: 
1. the SC’s guidance on how tribunals should go about importing procedural 
standards from the civil courts system, namely that any standards should be 
imported with nuance, taking into account the differences between a tax tribunal 
and the ordinary court system; 
2. the SC’s unequivocal refusal to endorse an approach that would allow for the 
preferential treatment of HMRC or other public bodies and state agencies 
appearing before tribunals; 
3. the SC’s critique of the existing sanctions system for litigants who do not comply 
with time limits and cause delays that may prejudice the other parties to the 
dispute; 
4. the appropriate standard of review to be applied when attempting to determine 
whether the impugned decision was one that the decision-maker was entitled to 
make.2  
Facts 
Following a corporate rearrangement, BPP Holdings Ltd (BPP), a company providing 
education and books to students, was divided into separate companies. One of the new 
companies, BPP University College of Professional Studies Ltd (UC), took over the duties of 
providing education, while another, BPP Learning Media Ltd (LM), was responsible for the 
supply of books. Of these two new entities, it was accepted that UC made standard-rated 
supplies for VAT purposes, but BPP took the view that the LM’s supplies were zero-rated and 
did not account for VAT on its supplies. In response, HMRC issued VAT assessments on LM, 
arguing that BPP’s approach was flawed, or alternatively, that the rearrangement constituted 
an abuse. BPP appealed this assessment to the “FTT”. HMRC served their statement of case 
with a 14-day delay, while additionally failing to set out clearly the facts on which they would 
rely to support their contention that VAT was owed. In light of this, BPP requested further 
information and an order was made by the “FTT” directing HMRC to reply within a specific 
timeframe. The order was accompanied by a stern warning, informing HMRC that failure to 
comply may result in an order barring them from taking further part in the proceedings. 
While HMRC responded within the set time limit, BPP applied for a debarring order against 
HMRC, on the basis that the responses provided did not in fact sufficiently address each of 
the questions posed in BPP’s request for information. Judge Mosedale in the “FTT” accepted 
that the responses provided by HMRC were wholly inadequate and the debarring order was 
granted.3 This decision was subsequently appealed by HMRC to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) 
                                                                 
1 BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55; [2017] STC 1655. 
2 The standard was set out by Lord Greene in  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 
KB 223 (CA), and requires the reviewing judge to assess whether the decision -maker’s determination was “so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”. 
3 BPP University College of Professional Studies v HMRC (BPP University College of Professional Studies (FTT)) 
[2014] UKFTT 644 (TC). 
which allowed the appeal.4 The Court of Appeal then restored the debarring order5 and the 
case was finally appealed by HMRC to the “SC”. The single judgment was given by Lord 
Neuberger, with whom the remaining justices agreed. 
1. The contribution of Civil Procedure to the procedure before tribunals 
An initial issue raised in the judgment under examination relates to the appropriate 
approach tax tribunals must take when determining the applicable sanction for a party that 
fails to comply with procedural directions. 
 In reaching her conclusion to bar HMRC from future proceedings, Judge Mosedale in 
the “FTT” 6 had relied on guidance provided in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
(Mitchell).7 Non-compliance with such orders was traditionally excused in instances where 
the prejudice caused to the other parties by the non-compliance could be remedied, for 
instance, through payment of costs. However, following reforms to the Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPRs),8 the Court of Appeal in Mitchell held that a stricter approach should be taken against 
a party that failed to comply with procedural rules, even if the sanction was “harsh”.9 It was 
not sympathetic to claims by the appellant’s solicitors that their failure to lodge a costs 
budget in the appropriate timeframe was attributable to work-related pressures and should 
be excused.10  CPRs, however, do not apply to tribunals which have their own procedural 
regulations.11 While there are some significant similarities between the respective rules of 
procedure, there were also “clear differences in the words”12 used. Therefore, the question 
for the “SC” in BPP Holdings Ltd was whether Judge Mosedale was correct in taking Mitchell 
into account. More specifically, was there any persuasive value that could be assigned to case 
law relating to rules of procedure in civil litigation when assessing the appropriate sanction 
for breaching tribunal orders in the context of a tax dispute? 
 In his analysis, Lord Neuberger endorses the view that when examining issues of 
procedure, tribunals may rely on standards developed by the courts.13 Tribunals “should 
generally follow a similar approach”14 to the ordinary court system where sanctions are 
concerned. This reliance, however, must be exercised with caution and is not all-
encompassing. Thus, in BPP Holdings Ltd, Lord Neuberger highlights two important matters 
                                                                 
4 HMRC v BPP Holdings Ltd and others [2014] UKUT 496 (TCC); [2015] STC 415. 
5 BPP Holdings Ltd v HMRC (BPP Holdings Ltd (CA)) [2016] EWCA Civ 121. Rather oddly, although Lord Neuberger 
appears to distance the SC from the CA’s judgment by saying that although it agreed with its conclusion, it  “should 
not be taken as approving all its reasoning” (BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [9]) there is no point 
at which the CA’s reasoning is specifically criticised by the SC. 
6  BPP University College of Professional Studies v HMRC (BPP University College of Professional Studies (FTT)) , 
above fn.3, [2014] UKFTT 644 (TC). 
7 Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537; [2014] 1 WLR 795. In  Mitchell, the Court of 
Appeal was assessing how strictly it should “enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders in the 
light of the changes made to CPR r 3.9 ”. See C. Brockman, The Jackson Reforms and the Mitchell Decision, available 
at: http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/uploadedFiles/RelieffromSanction-CB.pdf January 2014 [Accessed 8 
November 2017]. 
8 These changes to the CPRs were brought under the “Jackson Reforms” that recommended tougher sanctions for 
non-compliance. See Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (TSO, 2010). See also, J.R. 
Williams, “‘Well, That’s a Relief (From Sanctions)!’—Time to Pause and Take Stock of CPR r.3.9 Developments 
Within a General Theory of Case Management” (2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 394; A. Higgins, “CPR 3.9: The 
Mitchell Guidance, the Denton Revision, and Why Coded Messages Don’t Make for Good Case Management” 
(2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 379; Lord Justice Richards, “The Mitchell/Denton Line of Cases: Securing 
Compliance with Rules and Court Orders” (2015) 34 Civil Justice Quarterly 249. 
9 Mitchell, above fn.7, [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 at [59]. 
10 Mitchell, above fn.7, [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 at [81]. The Court of Appeal was particularly dismissive of this 
claim as it stressed that: “Solicitors cannot take on too much work and expect to be able to persuade a court that 
this is a good reason for their failure to meet deadlines. They should either delegate the work to others in their 
firm or, if they are unable to do this, they should not take on the work at all. This may seem harsh especially at a 
time when some solicitors are facing serious financial pressures. But the need to comply with rules, practice 
directions and court orders is essential if litigation is to be conducted in an efficient manner”. 
11 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2698). Particularly relevant to the case was r.8. 
12 Per Justice Moore-Bick in the Court of Appeal: BPP Holdings Ltd (CA), above fn.5, [2016] EWCA Civ 121 at [17]. 
13 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [23]. 
14 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [26]. 
that tribunals should take into account when seeking guidance on procedure from the 
ordinary court system. 
 First, Lord Neuberger notes that the jurisdiction of some tribunals extends to the 
whole of the UK and therefore, they should strive to apply any rules in a uniform manner 
across the UK.15 Consequently, tribunal judges, when seeking guidance from civil procedure 
standards, should be wary of focusing solely on the procedural jurisprudence developed in 
the English and Welsh courts. Approaches in Northern Ireland and Scotland should also be 
taken into account.16  
 Secondly, Lord Neuberger identifies the limitations of relying on case law relating to 
sanctions for failure to comply with time limits under the CPRs. While weight must be given 
to the courts’ approach, the differences between civil courts and tax tribunals must also be 
given due consideration before any standards are imported to the tribunal system. 
Ultimately, the courts’ approach to CPRs and sanctions should not be imported directly to tax 
tribunals. Lord Neuberger agreed with the Court of Appeal’s finding in that the approach 
followed by Judge Mosedale in the “FTT” was indeed characterised by nuance, and due 
regard was given to the differences between tax tribunals and the ordinary court system. 
Therefore, her reliance on Mitchell was appropriate and did not constitute a reason to allow 
HMRC’s appeal. 
 This approach of the “SC” seeks to clarify the relationship between tribunal and court 
procedure. The “SC” recognises that, inevitably, tribunal judges will draw inspiration from 
civil court procedure. This, for Lord Neuberger, is a wholly appropriate means to develop 
tribunal procedures, but decisions of the courts should be treated only as giving guidance by 
analogy. Tribunals must therefore remain aware of their distinct status in the broader justice 
system. It is questionable whether the “SC”’s approach here provides sufficient guidance to 
tribunal judges in this regard. The “SC” seems reluctant to provide a more thorough account 
of what a “nuanced” approach would consist of, and it does not identify the procedural rules 
which should not be directly imported to the tribunal system. It appears that the “SC” is 
happy to allow the tribunal system itself to carry out this exercise, as long as the approach 
followed stays within the parameters set by the “SC” in this judgment, namely that the 
standards should not be imported directly, and due regard should be given to the whole of 
the UK. 
2. Can state agencies benefit from special treatment before tribunals?  
A key characteristic of tribunals is that they adopt a more informal and flexible approach to 
the delivery of justice than do the courts.17 This led HMRC to argue that debarring them was 
a particularly draconian measure which contravened the public interest. First it was argued 
that the public interest dictated payment of tax. As it was very likely that were the debarring 
order allowed to stand, the VAT would not be recovered, the order unnecessarily prevented 
HMRC from discharging their public duty18 and was a sanction that was particularly 
disproportionate. HMRC’s second argument was that as this was an important test case for 
HMRC.19 Debarring them was a sanction that would have repercussions far beyond this 
specific case, as it could result in a decision on the VAT status of a supply that would be 
“erroneous and accordingly contrary to the public interest” which would have an impact on 
other disputes awaiting this decision.20  
 Lord Neuberger’s response was that these arguments relating to the public interest 
could not be accepted as adequate or satisfactory. As he stressed, rather than providing 
further leeway to HMRC on the basis that they are a state agency carrying out an important 
                                                                 
15 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [23]. 
16 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [23]. 
17 “[T]ribunals are quicker, cheaper, more informal and more expert than the Courts”. See M. Elliott and R. 
Thomas, Public Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 687. 
18 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
19 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [19]. 
20 This argument was presented by HMRC in the CA: BPP Holdings Ltd (CA), above fn.5, [2016] EWCA Civ 121 at 
[28] point f. 
public function, courts and tribunals should instead “expect higher standards from public 
bodies than from private bodies or individuals”21 when assessing whether a party in a 
dispute should be sanctioned for a failure to follow tribunal orders. While Lord Neuberger 
seems to acknowledge a legitimate public interest in the collection of VAT, there was an at 
least equal, if not more compelling interest in securing the fairness of proceedings between 
the two parties. This meant that allowing for preferential treatment of HMRC in tax 
proceedings would be an unacceptable outcome. In fact, he went further, and noted that 
there were no sufficiently convincing reasons put forward by HMRC to justify why a different 
approach should be adopted between the ordinary court system and tribunals where 
litigation process is concerned.22 Therefore, the informality associated with tribunals does 
not, per the “SC”, allow for departures from procedural rules that would seriously 
disadvantage the other parties. 
 The importance of this case as a test case was also rejected as a relevant factor 
worthy of consideration. The “SC” recounted the “FTT”’s approach on the matter.23 Judge 
Mosedale in the “FTT” had argued here that any legal authority that would potentially be 
attached to the final decision for BPP would be undermined by the fact that the case would 
be heard unopposed.24 Additionally, the “SC” noted, that the fact that the appeal would be 
heard unopposed, thereby increasing the chances of BPP’s success in the proceedings, was 
not a matter worthy of weighty consideration, “save in exceptional circumstances”.25  
 Thus, the key consideration for the tribunal judge to take into account was the 
interest in protecting the inviolability of tribunal orders, especially in light of the fact that no 
explanation was provided to justify HMRC’s dilatoriness. If tribunal orders could easily be 
ignored with impunity by the parties, especially state authorities, individuals challenging 
state agency decisions before a tribunal would be left without any meaningful remedy for 
any prejudice they suffered. This would in turn compromise the effectiveness of tribunals as 
mechanisms to challenge and complain against public authorities. 
 For these reasons, this is a particularly welcome aspect of the “SC”’s judgment. 
Placing HMRC in a position of dominance could have consequently placed any party 
appealing a determination of HMRC in a position of significant disadvantage in the course of 
the proceedings before the tax chamber. The “SC”, while not mentioning this point explicitly, 
demonstrates sensitivity in upholding key values associated with good administration and 
administrative justice more broadly. If a tribunal was consistently lenient in favour of a state 
agency, on the basis that the agency should fulfil its public duty without obstruction, the 
legitimacy of the tribunal appeals system would be undermined.26 The strict application of 
the rules to HMRC should be useful in future cases, especially if an appellant with limited 
means is faced with undue delay by HMRC. As Lord Neuberger correctly asserts, “a 
dangerous precedent”27 would have been set if an alternative approach had been adopted by 
the “FTT”. 
3. The severity of the sanction the FTT imposed on HMRC  
In light of the public interest in favour of allowing HMRC to participate in the appeal that was 
discussed in the previous section, the “SC” also took the opportunity to comment on the 
existing sanctions regime available to tribunal judges. It had been agreed by both parties that 
the measure taken against HMRC was particularly draconian.28  
                                                                 
21 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
22 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
23 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [19]. 
24 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [19]. 
25 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [32]. 
26 Furthermore, this would cast doubt over the judicial independence and impartiality of the tribunal system. 
Securing structural independence of the tribunal system was a key impetus behind the merger of the HM Courts 
and Tribunals Service. See Elliott and Thomas, above fn.17, 633. 
27 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
28 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
 Lord Neuberger also acknowledged that a debarring order was a particularly strict 
sanction given the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, this was the only sanction 
available to the tribunal judge. This placed her in the unenviable position of either having to 
provide no remedy to BPP, which meant that HMRC “would have got away with it”,29 or to 
make the debarring order which would potentially, as demonstrated above, have 
ramifications beyond the facts of the specific case. In light of this, Lord Neuberger argued 
that additional sanctioning powers ought to be granted to tribunals,30 replacing the existing 
binary options, of either no sanction or debarring HMRC, both of which were deemed to be 
“unpalatable”.31 This plea to create a more nuanced sanctions regime was immediately 
mitigated, however. Lord Neuberger recognised the complications associated with 
formulating an effective and proportionate system of sanctions and thus clarified the 
position by saying that the point was mentioned with “diffidence”.32 Nevertheless, BPP 
Holdings Ltd serves to illustrate the dilemma facing tribunal judges who want to uphold the 
fairness of the overall proceedings whilst also serving the public interest. It is hoped that 
Lord Neuberger’s obiter statements on the matter can become the impetus for a broader 
reconsideration of the available relevant sanctions that a tribunal judge can impose on a 
party causing undue delay to proceedings. 
4. Was the debarring order a determination the FTT was entitled to make? The limits 
of judicial review of tribunal decisions 
The “SC”, in determining whether a debarring order was a sanction the “FTT” was entitled to 
impose, sought to examine the relevance of the considerations taken into account by the 
“FTT” judge and, conversely, whether any relevant considerations were ignored. The “FTT”, 
in reaching its conclusion, had carefully assessed the prejudice to BPP caused by the delay, 
namely the fact that BPP would not have adequate time to properly prepare its case or to 
address the points raised by HMRC. This was compounded by  
“the absence of any explanation or excuse for the failure, coupled with the existence 
of other failures by HMRC to comply with directions” .33  
 The “SC”, once again, endorsed the “FTT”’s approach in this regard. HMRC, by 
disputing the relevance of the reasons taken into account and by arguing that relevant 
considerations were not taken into account (the public interest in collecting VAT, the public 
duty of HMRC to collect it), asserted that no reasonable authority applying its powers would 
have granted the order. In rejecting this claim, the “SC” reiterated the limits of its supervisory 
powers. The “SC” (and the appellate judge more broadly) does not engage in a thorough 
examination of the merits of the determination under review, nor does it substitute its own 
opinion for that of the original decision-maker. The power has been conferred on the “FTT” 
to make this determination, and whether the “SC”, or another judge examining the case, 
would have reached the same conclusion given the available facts, is irrelevant. A mere 
disagreement as to the outcome of the case does not suffice for the “SC” to set it aside on the 
grounds that it was unreasonable. A determination, per Lord Neuberger, must be 
“unjustifiable”34 for the “SC” to quash it. The impugned debarring order could not “cross that 
high hurdle”35 given the circumstances of this case and therefore, was allowed to stand. 
 While the debarring order was, in Lord Neuberger’s view, not “beyond the limit of 
permissible harshness”36 it was “not far from that limit”.37 The borderline nature of this case, 
                                                                 
29 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
30 “There may be force in the notion that the tribunal rules should provide for the possibility of more nuanced 
sanctions, such as a fine or even the imposition of some procedural advantage”:  BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, 
[2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
31 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
32 “Experience suggests that such ideas, while attractive in theory, can often be difficult to formulate or to apply 
satisfactorily in practice, so I mention the point with some diffidence”: BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 
55 at [35]. 
33 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [54]. 
34 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [33]. 
35 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [33]. 
36 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [34]. 
however, is attributed more to the lack of a nuanced sanction system than to the 
unreasonableness of Judge Mosedale’s order. The threshold of unreasonableness thus 
remains one that is particularly difficult to reach, a hurdle that will be overcome in 
particularly limited and extreme circumstances. The “SC” thus demonstrates no willingness 
to lower this threshold in this case. 
Conclusion 
BPP Holdings Ltd provided an opportunity for the “SC” to clarify a host of significant issues 
relating to the appropriate procedure in the tribunal system. Lord Neuberger’s judgment is 
noteworthy, first, for affirming the importance of fairness in tribunal proceedings, especially 
where one party to the dispute is a public authority. The purported public interest in the 
collection of VAT payments and the interest in allowing HMRC to carry out their public duty 
cannot override, in the “SC”’s estimation, the need to ensure that public bodies live up to the 
expected standards in the conduct of litigation. The “SC” also encourages tribunals to rely on 
the court system to draw analogies that may be useful for the implementation of the 
tribunal’s own rules of procedure on the condition that any influence from the ordinary court 
system is nuanced. BPP Holdings Ltd also serves to illustrate the shortcomings of the current 
sanctions system available to tribunal judges. It remains to be seen whether Lord 
Neuberger’s concerns will become a source of motivation for changes to the current regime. 
Finally, the judgment confirms that a decision-maker’s determination will not be set aside as 
unreasonable, unless the outcome is manifestly without justification. Ultimately, Lord 
Neuberger asserts that even in this case, where an arguably severe sanction was imposed, 
the determination was not “on the wrong side of the line”38 of reasonableness. 
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37 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [34]. 
38 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [34]. 
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